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Abstract
Contrary to what has been argued by a number of critics, the AD-AS
framework is both internally consistent and in conformity with Keynes￿ s
own analysis. Moreover, the eclectic approach to behavioral foundations
allows models in this tradition to take into account aggregation problems
as well as evidence from behavioral economics. Unencumbered by the
straightjacket of optimizing microfoundations, the approach can provide
a useful starting point for the analysis of dynamic macroeconomic inter-
actions. In developing this analysis, the AD-AS approach can draw on
insights from the Post Keynesian, neo-Marxian and structuralist tradi-
tions, as well as from the burgeoning literature on behavioral economics.
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Along with various coauthors, Chiarella and Flaschel have been engaged over
the last 15 years in a research program on integrated Keynesian disequilibrium
dynamics (IKDD). The results have been impressive. Using sophisticated math-
ematical and computational techniques, the research has greatly increased our
understanding of Keynesian models and the very complex dynamics that these
models may generate.
The contrast between the IKDD and New Keynesian approach (NK) is strik-
ing. The IKDD follows an ￿old Keynesian tradition￿of formal mathematical
modeling. The simple static predecessor is the IS-LM model or its cousin, the
AD-AS model. This chapter discusses the merits of this old Keynesian tradition
and the relation between this tradition (and IKDD) and the post Keynesian and
New Keynesian approaches.
Section 2 outlines a standard version of the AD-AS model and shows that
it can be given a logically consistent Marshallian interpretation. It also shows
that the model does not, as claimed by some critics, su⁄er from internal logi-
cal contradictions. Section 3 discusses some alleged shortcomings of the model.
Section 4 considers the NK alternative - focusing on two main issues, microeco-
nomic foundations and the treatment of stability - and comments on the IKDD
treatment of expectations. Section 5 introduces post Keynesian and other ar-
guments for the relevance of aggregate demand, not just in the short run but
also as an in￿ uence on real outcomes in the medium and the long run. Section
6, ￿nally, ends with a few concluding remarks.
2 The AD-AS framework
Several turn-of-the-century assessments of the state of macroeconomics regard
the discipline as healthy. There may have been ￿erce debates and controver-
sies, but these debates mainly served to highlight de￿ciencies of existing models
and to stimulate the creation of new improved hybrid models. The history of
macroeconomics, according to Blanchard (2000, p. 1375) is ￿one of a surpris-
ingly steady accumulation of knowledge￿ , and ￿progress in macroeconomics may
well be the success story of twentieth century economics￿ . Woodford￿ s (1999) as-
sessment gives slightly more weight to the disagreements and revolutions in the
second half of the twentieth century. But Woodford also sees convergence, and
he concludes that ￿modern macroeconomic models are intertemporal general
equilibrium models derived from the same foundations of optimizing behavior
on the part of households and ￿rms as are employed in other branches of eco-
nomics￿ (p. 31). We disagree with these assessments. In our view, a large
part of what has happened in macroeconomics since the late 1960s has been a
wasteful detour. A generation of macroeconomists has grown up learning tools
that may be sophisticated, but the usefulness of these tools is questionable.
Moreover, a great deal of damage may be, and has been, done when the tools
are applied to real-world situations. For all their limitations, the simple mod-
1els of the old Keynesian school using the Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply
(AD-AS) framework provide a better starting point for serious analysis than
more recent models in the New Keynesian (NK) or Real Business Cycle (RBC)
traditions which have come to dominate modern macroeconomics.
Following Keynes, the AD-AS approach visualizes the economy as a whole,
that is, the theory is ￿ general￿ rather than ￿ partial￿ .1 Keynes￿ s (1936/1973)
derivation of a ￿x-wage general equilibrium in chapters 1-18 of The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (GT) was an enormous intellectual
achievement, and the one stressed by both Blanchard and Woodford in their ac-
counts of the Keynesian revolution. The AD-AS framework gives a reasonable
representation of the analytical skeleton behind this ￿x-wage general equilib-
rium. The strength of the AD-AS apparatus is precisely the explicit attempt to
integrate the analysis of goods, labor and ￿nancial markets.
The AD-AS framework divides the economy into two parts ￿the ￿ demand
side￿and the ￿ supply side￿￿and examines their interaction using accounting
identities, equilibrium conditions and behavioral and institutional equations.
The ￿ demand side￿typically examines factors relating to the demand for goods
and the demand and supply of assets. The ￿ supply side￿typically examines
factors relating to output and pricing decisions of producers, and factor mar-
kets. The framework ensures that neither demand nor supply side factors are
overlooked in the analysis and that macroeconomic outcomes depend on the
interaction between the di⁄erent markets. The particular partitioning into ￿ ag-
gregate demand￿and ￿ aggregate supply￿along with the choice of terminology
may provide the pedagogic advantage of making macroeconomic analysis pos-
sible in terms of the same tools as the simplest microeconomic model of the
market. But this advantage comes at a high price. The aggregate demand and
supply curves embody complex interactions and are clearly not the same as the
microeconomic curves which take a partial view of the economy. The analogy
therefore is spurious, and forgetting this has led to a great deal of confusion in
the literature, as brie￿ y discussed later.
The basic AD-AS model is well-known, of course, but to ease the exposition
it is helpful to state a simple version of it explicitly. There are two equilibrium
conditions
1According to the preface to the French edition of the GT, written three years after the
English publication, Keynes (1936/1973, p. xxxii) explains:
I have called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chie￿y con-
cerned with the behavior of the economic system as a whole, - with aggregate
incomes, aggregate pro￿ts, aggregate output, aggregate employment, aggregate
investment, aggregate saving rather than with the incomes, pro￿ts, output, em-
ployment, investment and saving of particular industries, ￿rms and individuals.
And I argue that important mistakes have been made through extending to the
system as a whole conclusions which have been arrived at in respect of a part of
it taken in isolation.
2Y = C + I + G (1)
M=P = L (2)
where, in standard notation, Y is real output, C;I and G, denote real consump-
tion, investment and government expenditure, M the supply of money, P the
price level, and L the real demand for money, and six behavioral or institutional
equations
C = C(Y ) (3)
I = I(r) (4)
L = L(Y;r) (5)
Y = F(N) (6)
W=Pe = F0(N) (7)
W = W0 (8)
where 0 < C0 < 1;I0 < 0;L1 > 0;L2 < 0;F0 > 0 and F0 < N, and where r is the
rate of interest, N the level of employment, W the money wage, and Pe is the
price expected by ￿rms. Equations (3) through (6) are standard consumption,
investment, money demand and production functions. Since C, I and L are
used to denote desired amounts in equations (3) through (5), equations (1) and
(2) are equilibrium conditions (rather than accounting identities) showing that
output is equal to the demand for it and that the money supply in real terms
is equal to the demand for it. Behind these equilibrium conditions lie dynamic
adjustment processes with excess demand for goods leading to an increase in
P and excess demand for money leading to an increase in r.2 Equation (6) is
the pro￿t maximizing condition of ￿rms that are assumed to be price takers in
perfectly competitive markets; since there is a production lag and ￿rms make
production plans prior to knowing what price they will receive for their goods,
the price that is relevant for their production decision is the expected price.
The levels of M;G and W are given exogenously. To stress that this is the case
for the money wage, equation (7) states that the money wage is given at the
exogenous level W0.
Our interpretation of the model is Marshallian and we examine the behavior
of the economy in two di⁄erent ￿ runs￿ . The expected price and the level of output
are given in the ￿ market￿(or ￿ ultra-short￿ ) run. In the ￿ short￿run expected price
changes in response to its deviations from the actual price, and this change is
2The dynamics can be explicitly formalized by the equations
dP=dt = ￿G[C + I + G ￿ Y ]
dr=dt = ￿A[L ￿ (M=P)]
where t denotes time and ￿i are speed of adjustment parameters for the goods and asset
markets.
3accompanied by changes in the level of production; in a short-run equilibrium
expectations are being met and the expected and actual price coincide.
In the market run, given Pe, and given W from equation (8), N is determined
by equation (7), and Y by equation (6). For this level of Y , substitution of
equations (3) and (4) into equation (1) yields a value of r which satis￿es that
equation, irrespective of the price level. The IS curve in Figure 1, which shows
equilibrium in the goods market in (P;r)-space , is vertical at this level of r.3
The vertical arrows show the direction of price adjustments when the economy
is out of goods market equilibrium. Also for the given level of Y , substitution
of equation (5) into equation (2) yields a positive LM relation between P and r,
which represents money (and assets) market equilibrium. The horizontal arrows
show the direction of interest adjustments when the economy is out of money-
market equilibrium. The intersection of the IS and LM curves gives the market-
run equilibrium values of P and r. The equilibrium value of r is determined by
the position of the vertical IS curve, and the LM curve determines the value of
P. With o⁄-equilibrium dynamics given by the equations in note 2, it is readily
seen that the market-run equilibrium is stable for a given Y .
In the short run Pe is allowed to change in response to unful￿lled expec-
tations. When Pe changes to a new level, ￿rms adjust their employment and
output levels. This adjustment is captured by the AS curve, which shows the
pro￿t-maximizing level of output produced by the ￿rms for a given Pe. When
Y changes, the IS and LM curves shift in (r;P)-space and determine a new
market-run equilibrium of r and P. The level of P which clears goods and
money markets for each level of Y is shown along the AD curve. A higher level
3If we introduce real balance e⁄ects which make C (and, possibly, I) depend positively on
M=P, the IS curve would be negatively sloped rather than vertical. We abstract from this
complication here, but refer to it later.
4of Y increases the level of saving, so that goods market equilibrium requires an
increase in investment, a fall in r and hence a leftward shift of the IS curve. A
higher level of Y increases the real demand for money, so that money market
equilibrium requires a fall in P (or an increase in r), so that the LM curve shifts
to the right in (r;P)-space. Consequently, a higher Y implies a lower P for
market-run equilibrium, explaining the negative slope of the AD curve.
The short-run dynamics shown in Figure 1 can be described as follows. Start-
ing from an initial level of expected price, Pe
1, output is determined at Y1 (as
shown by the AS curve) and price at P1 (as shown by the AD curve). Since
P1 > Pe
1, if ￿rms revise their price expectations adaptively, Pe rises, making Y
expand along the AS curve and the market-run equilibrium move along the AD
curve (representing shifts in the IS and LM curve) as shown by the arrow. This
adjustment will continue till the economy arrives at the short-run equilibrium
at the intersection of the AD and AS curves, where P = Pe.4
Three comments about this model are in order. First, the Marshallian in-
terpretation of the model ￿nds a great deal of exegetical support in Keynes￿ s
own work and in the writings of many Keynesians. Clower (1989), for instance,
notes the Marshallian aspects of Keynes￿ s GT, although not as precisely as done
in our model (see Dutt, 1992).
Second, the Marshallian interpretation is important for the internal consis-
tency of the economic argument. It has been argued by Barro (1994), Fields
and Hart (1990), Colander (1995) and Bhaduri, Laski and Riese (1999) that the
AD-AS model embodies two mutually-contradictory approaches to pricing and
production by ￿rms. According to this criticism, the AD curve is based on IS
and LM curves, but the analysis assumes that ￿rms ￿x the price (having the
ability to do so) and that equilibrium levels of r and Y are determined from
equations (1) and (2), using (3) through (5). The story told is that ￿rms ￿x their
price and adjust their output in response to changes in demand conditions. The
AS curve, on the other hand, assumes price taking behavior on the part of ￿rms
operating in purely competitive markets with demand constraints, producing
to maximize pro￿ts given the money wage and the production function. While
some textbook versions of the AD-AS model do su⁄er from this inconsistency,
our Marshallian model is free of it. The equations of the model are similar to
those of the standard textbook version,5 but in our interpretation the AD and
AS curves both embody pro￿t maximization and price-taking behavior: the AD
curve in our interpretation shows equilibrium price for a given level of output
and not, as the standard AD curve, the equilibrium value of Y for di⁄erent
levels of P.6
4The stability of short run equilibrium can be veri￿ed by representing the dynamics of
expected price by the equation
dPe=dt = ￿E[P ￿ Pe]
where ￿E > 0 is the speed of expectations adjustment parameter.
5For a discussion of the history of the AD-AS model, including that of its emergence and
spread in macroeconomic textbooks, see Dutt (2002).
6See Dutt and Skott (1996) for further discussion of the internal-consistency criticisms.
5Third, the model can easily be recast using Keynes￿ s own ￿ AD-AS diagram￿
with employment and the value of output (price times quantity) on the axes (he
did not actually draw this diagram in GT, but described it in words in chapter
3).7 Keynes￿ s Aggregate Supply function is given by W0F(N)=F0(N) and is
derived from equations (6), (7) and (8): its curve shows the expected value of
output at each level of employment consistent with pro￿t maximizing behavior.
The Aggregate Demand function is derived from equations (1) through (6), and
its curve shows the actual equilibrium proceeds (PY ) for any given level of
N. The level of N determines Y from equation (6), and given this Y; P is
determined as shown in the IS-LM diagram of Figure 1, which determines the
equilibrium level of PY . The value of aggregate demand at the intersection
between the supply and demand curves de￿nes ￿the e⁄ective demand￿(GT, p.
25).
By construction expectations are being met at the point of e⁄ective demand.
In chapter 5 of GT, however, Keynes discusses the formation and revision of
short-period expectations, showing how ￿rms produce a certain level of output
with a certain level of employment, given short period expectations, and then
adjust these expectations if they are not ful￿lled. Though he does not explicitly
analyze this process, we can do so by using the expected proceeds curve, given
by PeY = PeF(N), for a given Pe from equation (6): it shows what ￿rms
expect the value of output to be for a given price expectation. The intersection
of this curve with the curve for the Aggregate Supply function determines the
market-run equilibrium level of employment since it satis￿es equation (7). For
the market-run equilibrium employment level, one can read o⁄ actual proceeds
from the Aggregate Demand function. If actual proceeds are di⁄erent from
expected proceeds, Pe will change, shifting the expected proceeds curve, till
the economy arrives at short-run equilibrium at the intersection of all three
curves.8 For most of the GT, however, Keynes con￿nes attention to short-run
equilibrium in which actual and expected price are equal, thereby concealing the
Marshallian adjustment process because it was not central to his demonstration
of the possibility of unemployment short-run equilibrium.9
7He probably used this type of diagram, rather than that in (P;Y ) space, because aggregate
price level and real output were not in common use in his day, while value of output and total
employment, involving fewer aggregation problems, were.
8Keynes￿ s Aggregate Demand function does not actually use the simultaneous equations
approach to solving P, focusing only on goods market equilibrium without taking into account
asset markets explicitly. An alternative formulation of the model, which focuses only on the
goods market, but allows consumption demand to respond to price changes due to either the
real balance e⁄ect or distribution shifts, can easily be developed. See Dutt (1987) for a version
in which changes in price a⁄ect the value of output through changes in income distribution
between wages and pro￿ts.
9The Treatise on Money had concentrated on the Marshallian ultra-short run (or market
run) equilibrium:
My so-called ￿ fundamental equations￿were an instantaneous picture taken on
the assumption of a given output. They attempted to show how, assuming the
given output, forces could develop which involved a pro￿t-disequilibrium, and
thus required a change in the level of output. But the dynamic development,
as distinct from the instantaneous picture, was left incomplete and extremely
63 Shortcomings
An AD-AS model of the type just described has many well-known weaknesses
and limitations, of which three are relevant for our purposes.
The criticisms that have received the most attention concern the alleged
lack of microeconomic foundations of the model. NKs (along with new classical
economists and RBC theorists), who have been vocal in this criticism, wish to
supplant the model with models based on explicit optimization. We shall take
up the issue of optimizing microfoundations in section 4 where we discuss the
NK approach. But the behavioral approach of the AD-AS model has also been
criticized from another angle. Many post Keynesian economists, but also some
impeccably mainstream old Keynesians, have suggested that the model is too
mechanical and does not take into account uncertainty and expectations in a
serious manner.10 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to address this
important issue in any detail but in our view, ￿ mechanical￿mathematical formal-
ization can be extremely useful. This formalization needs to be supplemented by
verbal descriptions and empirical analysis, and less formal discussions of possi-
ble outcomes may also come into play if the relations determining the evolution
of the system are not capable of being formalized in a precise manner. Even this
informal discussion, however, will often bene￿t from using more formal analyses
as points of reference and by suggesting where and how the results of the models
may need to be modi￿ed. Models which modify these ￿ mechanical￿models to
incorporate informal discussions of changes in expectations can and have been
developed.11
A second set of criticisms claims that the AD-AS model omits many im-
portant features of reality and that some of its implications are not consistent
with empirical observation. Assumptions of imperfect competition, for instance,
should replace perfect competition, and the money supply should not be treated
as an exogenous variable in an economy with modern monetary institutions.12
The consumption function should also take into account income distributional
e⁄ects on consumption, increases in aggregate demand should provide a direct
stimulus to investment, and the distinction between nominal and real rates of in-
terest may be critical (not least for the reactions of aggregate demand to changes
in money wages and the stability of full employment). These (and other) mod-
confused (Keynes, 1936/1973, p. xxii).
Skott (1989, 1989a) develops a model of cyclical growth using the Marshallian (or Keynes-
of-the-Treatise) ultra-short run equilibrium as the basic building block; see also Skott (1983)
for a discussion of this Marshallian approach and the relation between the Treatise on Money
and the GT.
10For a review of post Keynesian contributions see Dutt and Amadeo (1990). For more
mainstream discussions, see Hicks (1980-81), Tobin (1975) and Meltzer (1988).
11For instance, Kregel￿ s (1976) informal discussion of the interaction between Keynes￿ s
short-period and long-period expectations has been formalized in Dutt (1997) to produce
path-dependent equilibria.
12See, for instance, Moore (1988). New Keynesians have also abandoned the exogenous-
money assumption, but rather than stressing the nature of monetary institutions, they focus
on the speci￿c policy rule adopted by the Central Bank in the US and elsewhere (e.g. Romer,
2000, Woodford 2003)).
7i￿cations may complicate the model and a⁄ect some of its properties, but in
principle their introduction is quite straightforward and the resulting model can
still be depicted with AD and AS curves (see, for instance, Dutt and Skott,
1996, and section 5.1 below). The modi￿cations, moreover, help to address
some of the empirical criticisms of the AD-AS model. The simple model, for
instance, predicts a counter-cyclical movement of the real wage. This implica-
tion, which ￿nds little support in the data (as noted early on by Dunlop, 1938,
Tarshis, 1939), no longer holds in versions of the model that include imperfect
competition (perhaps with markup pricing ￿ la Kalecki, 1971) and some com-
bination of non-diminishing returns to labor and/or a counter-cyclical pattern
in the markup.
A third set of problems with the AD-AS model concerns the unsatisfactory
treatment of dynamics. There is a lack of integration between the analysis of the
short-run and more long-term issues, and even when it comes to the treatment of
the short run, the analysis often relies on unstated or questionable assumptions
concerning the process leading to a short-run Keynesian equilibrium. Our own
presentation above is quite explicit in its assumptions (notes 2 and 4) but, per-
haps unrealistically, it presumes that the adjustment to market-run equilibrium
is ￿ very fast￿relative to the adjustments of price expectations. The adjustment
to market-run equilibrium could therefore be based on given price expectations,
and in the analysis of adjustments to short-run equilibrium it could be assumed
that there is continuous market equilibrium during the adjustment process.13
The shortcomings of simple AD-AS models with respect to dynamics may be
a legacy of Keynes￿ s own focus on short-run equilibria in GT. The assumption of
ful￿lled expectations facilitated the presentation of the ￿x-wage general equilib-
rium.14 Unfortunately, it makes it hard to discuss the stability issues, and from
today￿ s perspective ￿having before us a well-developed theory of general equi-
librium ￿the truly revolutionary and provocative message of the GT concerns
the destabilizing e⁄ects of money wage ￿ exibility, rather than the existence of
a ￿x-wage equilibrium with unemployment.
13In the context of our simple speci￿cation, however, it is easy to prove that local stability
carries over to the case where P;Pe and r are all treated as state variables, with their dynamics
shown by the equations in notes 2 and 4.
14In a set of lecture notes from 1937, Keynes argues as follows:
When one is dealing with aggregates, aggregate e⁄ective demand at time A has
no corresponding aggregate income at time B. All one can compare is the ex-
pected and actual income resulting to an entrepreneur from a particular decision.
Actual investment may di⁄er through unintended stock changes, price changes,
alteration of decision. The di⁄erence, if any, is due to a mistake in the short-
period expectation and the importance of the di⁄erence lies in the fact that this
di⁄erence will be one of the relevant factors in determining subsequent e⁄ective
demand.
I began, as I have said, by regarding this di⁄erence as important. But even-
tually I felt it to be of secondary importance, emphasis on it obscuring the real
argument. For the theory of e⁄ective demand is substantially the same if we
assume that short-period expectations are always ful￿lled. (Keynes 1973, p.
181)
8The AD-AS model does not address the stability issue ￿it takes the money
wage as given - but can serve as a starting point. The model can be easily
extended in a way which makes it have the implications presented in the typical
textbook: (i) that unemployment can exist in the model because the money
wage is exogenously ￿xed; (ii) that if one allows the money wage to fall in
response to the existence of unemployment, the AS curve, given by P = F0(F ￿
1(Y ))=W is shifted downwards; and that (iii) this leads to an expansion of
output and employment along the negatively-sloped AD curve and moves the
economy to the ￿ natural rate of unemployment￿(corresponding to the absence of
Keynesian involuntary unemployment). The mechanism behind this adjustment
is the ￿ Keynes e⁄ect￿by which a reduction in wage and price increases the real
supply of money, lowers the interest rate, and increases investment and aggregate
demand. This e⁄ect can be supplemented by the real balance e⁄ect by which
the rise in real balances directly stimulates the aggregate demand for goods.
This standard analysis is at odds with Keynes￿ s own argument in GT where,
in chapter 19, he insisted that involuntary unemployment would not be elim-
inated by increased wage ￿ exibility. Falling money wages will in￿ uence the
economy in a number of ways but, on balance, are unlikely to stimulate out-
put.15 Keynes￿ s analysis of the e⁄ects of changes in money wages may have
been sketchy, but the logic behind potential instability is impeccable. The real
balance e⁄ect was overlooked by Keynes, but has been found to be empirically
insigni￿cant, and the expansionary e⁄ects of a decline in money wages due to
the Keynes e⁄ect may be more than o⁄set by the adverse in￿ uences of debt de-
￿ ation, distributional shifts, and expectations of continuing reductions of wages
and prices.16
These complicating factors can be addressed by an informal discussion of the
diverse e⁄ects of money wage changes, using the AD-AS model as the starting
point. This is basically what Keynes did in chapter 19 of GT. The analysis and
the destabilizing e⁄ects can be illustrated using the AD-AS diagram (see Dutt
and Amadeo, 1990). For instance, debt de￿ ation problems can make the AD
curve upward-sloping and, in addition, money wage reductions can shift the AD
curve to the left (because of a higher propensity to consume out of wage income
than non-wage income), both of which prevent the economy from converging to
the ￿ natural￿level of output.
Old Keynesians were well aware of the stability problem (e.g. Hicks (1974),
Tobin (1975)), but the treatment of dynamics in Keynesian models of a 1970s
vintage was unsatisfactory. There was a lack of integration between the analysis
of the short run and more long-term issues, and even the short run analysis often
relied on unstated assumptions concerning the process leading to a short-run
Keynesian equilibrium. Models of IKDD analyze these dynamic issues using
new and powerful mathematical tools. The aim has been to construct a frame-
15Hicks (1974) used the term Keynes￿ s ￿ wage theorem￿to denote the benchmark result that
variations in money wages have no net e⁄ects on real output and employment in a closed
economy￿ .
16Post Keynesians have stressed additional problems arising from the role of uncertainty,
the ￿nancial situation of ￿rms and the e⁄ects of an endogenous money supply.
9work in which "contributions to the non-market clearing paradigm could be
reformulated on a common basis and extended systematically, leading succes-
sively to more and more coherent integrated models of disequilibrium growth
with progressively richer interactions between markets and sectors" (Chiarella
and Flaschel, 2000, p. xix).
Starting from a simple AS-AD framework, IKDD models analyze the interac-
tion between multiple feedback mechanisms. Agents respond to disequilibrium
signals in a range of markets, and the analysis demonstrates that it is essen-
tial to look at interactions across these markets. Secondly, local instability is
con￿rmed as the most likely outcome, but plausible non-linearities ensure that
the movements of the variables remain bounded and economically meaningful.
Thus, the analysis demonstrates that the Keynesian models can generate very
complex dynamics and that local instability is a likely outcome for plausible
speci￿cations.
4 The New Keynesian detour and the IKDD al-
ternative
The New Keynesian approach can be characterized as one which attempts to
derive Keynesian conclusions with respect to the existence of unemployment
equilibrium and/or the e⁄ectiveness of aggregate demand policy, while using a
standard neoclassical methodology.
Unemployment equilibrium can be explained in terms of the optimizing be-
havior of agents in models that depart from Walrasian perfect competition by
introducing perceived demand curves for imperfectly competitive ￿rms, asym-
metric information, e¢ ciency wages, credit rationing, and the like.17 Some of
these models are very insightful, but they largely fail to address the issue of
involuntary unemployment in Keynes￿ s sense. Keynes explicitly de￿ned ￿ volun-
tary unemployment￿to include all frictional and structural unemployment, that
is, to include unemployment caused by minimum wage legislation and excessive
union wage demands, for instance. By extension, Keynes￿ s notion of voluntary
unemployment also includes structural unemployment generated by the various
departures from perfect competition that have been invoked by NK. Structural
unemployment of this kind may be theoretically interesting and empirically sig-
ni￿cant, but it is not the kind of unemployment addressed by Keynes. His
involuntary unemployment is de￿ned in terms of inadequate aggregate demand
and the failure of the market mechanism to ensure the adjustment of aggregate
demand to the level of aggregate supply associated with a structurally deter-
mined (minimum) rate of unemployment. It is the deviation from a structural
unemployment rate that makes demand policy desirable.
In NK models the e⁄ectiveness of aggregate demand policy is con￿ned to
the short run and derives from nominal wage and price rigidities. Some of the
17Some contributions are adventurous enough to depart from optimization to invoke ￿ near￿
rationality! See Akerlof and Yellen (1987).
10early NK models were of the spanner-in-the-works variety which merely intro-
duced nominal wage and price rigidities into new classical or RBC models with
rational expectations. But the NK methodology requires that such rigidities be
based on optimizing behavior: ￿rather than postulating that prices and wages
respond mechanically to some measure of market disequilibrium, they are set
optimally, that is, so as to best serve the interests of the parties assumed to set
them, according to the information available at the time￿(Woodford 2003, p.7).
Thus, prices and wages are set in a forward-looking manner, expectations are
assumed to be rational, and preferences are regarded as structural and invariant
to changes in policy.
Our comments on the NK approach focus on two issues: the obsession with
microeconomic foundations based on explicit optimization, and the treatment of
stability issues. The two issues are related since the obsession with optimization
stands in the way of serious stability analysis. Following that, we turn to the
IKDD alternative to discuss how it deals with expectations in its analysis of
stability issues.
4.1 Optimization
We may ￿rst note that microfoundations and optimization are not the same. Mi-
crofoundations requires clear and plausible accounts of how individual decision-
makers make decisions based on their goals and environments without necessar-
ily requiring the use of explicit optimization based on precise objective functions
and constraints. Moreover, optimization can be used to depict the behavior of
institutions like ￿rms and labor unions who are not individuals. The provision
of microfoundations of macroeconomics has much to recommend it, for instance,
in order to avoid ascribing internally-inconsistent behavior of decision-makers
and overlooking possible free-rider problems in making groups behave like indi-
viduals. However, microfoundations need to take into account in an appropriate
manner the macroeconomic environment in which individuals make decisions,
by providing what has been called the macroeconomic foundations of microeco-
nomics. We next turn to optimization itself.
Optimization can sometimes be very useful as a simple way of describing
goal-oriented behavior (indeed, both our simple AD-AS model and Keynes￿ s
own analysis included the assumption of pro￿t maximizing ￿rms). But insisting
on optimization can also result in problems. The problems with the optimization
approach are largely well-known and a brief summary of some of the main points
will su¢ ce.
The cognitive limitations and bounded rationality of all real-world decision
makers have been stressed by many authors, most notably perhaps by Simon,
and a more recent literature has documented the existence of systematic de-
partures from optimizing behavior (see Kahneman, 2000, and Camerer et al.,
2004). From this perspective the NK demand for optimizing microeconomic
foundations is remarkable primarily because of the highly restrictive form that
11it takes.18
Aggregation represents another problem for the optimizing approach. To
obtain de￿nite results, any theory of the economy as a whole has to engage
in aggregation. Thus, there can be no attempt at full disaggregation in the
agent space, as in Arrow-Debreu models of general equilibrium, and it is well-
known that even if all individual agents were fully rational and maximized well-
behaved utility functions subject to standard constraints, aggregate variables
do not behave as if determined by an optimizing representative agent (see, for
instance, Kirman, 1992). Aggregation problems therefore imply that the use of
an optimizing representative agent in NK models has little to recommend itself.
The existence of social norms and conventions provides a further reason to
eschew the mechanical application of optimization methods based on exoge-
nously given and constant preferences. The role of relative wages and norms of
fairness in Keynes￿ s GT analysis of wage formation presents an example of this
perspective. The existence of norms and conventions may be a source of ￿ con-
ditional stability￿in Keynesian models of uncertainty (Crotty, 1994) but norms
and conventions also change over time, both endogenously and as a result of
exogenous shocks. We shall return to these issues in section 5 below.
A more subtle danger of the optimization approach is that it may predis-
pose the analysis to slide from individual ￿ rationality￿to systemic ￿ rationality￿ .
Some economists may view optimization is simply an organizing principle (see
note 18), but countless examples suggest that an optimization approach may
generate (sometimes unconsciously) a slippery slope in which individual opti-
mization eventually leads to social optimality. Sargent (1993), for instance, is
able to assume bounded rationality and yet produce, eventually, his unique,
new classical equilibrium. As a second example, many of the problems caused
by e¢ ciency wage considerations can be ￿ solved￿when credit markets function
e¢ ciently (again, with clever institutions). A history of how a focus on indi-
vidual optimization in neoclassical economics inexorably, albeit tortuously, has
led to presumptions of social optimality awaits an author, if one does not exist
already.
A serious problem, ￿nally, arises from the bounded rationality of the theorist.
Carrying the straightjacket of optimization ￿especially in its dynamic versions
￿reduces the ability of the theory to incorporate many important aspects of
reality in a tractable manner, and therefore encourages the theorist to ignore
them. One may insist on treating all agents in a model as fully optimizing, but
there is a cost to meeting this demand. Simpli￿cations then need to be made in
other areas in order to keep the model tractable; the number of distinct agents,
for instance, may have to be kept very small and the nature of the interaction
18It can be argued that problems related to information gathering and computational ability
need not undermine the neoclassical optimizing hypothesis, because this hypothesis does not
assume rationality in an empirical sense (whatever that means), but simply uses the organizing
framework of analyzing behavior in terms of the optimization some objective function subject
to some constraints (see Boland, 1981). This argument, however, suggests that there is no
overriding justi￿cation for insisting on the use of the optimizing approach (for instance, based
on some notion of the rationality of economic agents), and that a non-optimizing approach
need not be inferior to the neoclassical one.
12between the agents very simple.
All useful models represent drastically stylized pictures of a complex reality.
The art of model building consists in choosing appropriate simplifying assump-
tions, and in our view the insistence on fully optimizing behavior represents a
suboptimal ￿ corner solution￿to the modeling problem: the gains from explicit
optimization are often minimal and the costs of the required simpli￿cations in
other areas high. Thus, over the last 30 years macroeconomists have struggled
to solve problems of intertemporal optimization. These optimization problems
grossly simplify real-world decision problems, and the astounding implicit pre-
sumption has been that agents in the real world solve (or act as if they had
solved) these much more complex problems. The neglect of aggregation prob-
lems and the use of representative agents in models that purport to provide
microeconomic foundations only serve to make the picture even more bizarre.
In fact, the contemporary approach with its sophisticated and perfectly rational
representative agents would seem to embody a good example of how not to use
mathematics: mathematical models arguably are useful primarily because they
allow a clear analysis of complex interactions between agents, each of whom
may follow relatively simple (but possibly changing) behavioral rules.
4.2 Stability and rational expectations
NK models may include non-clearing labor markets and allow for real e⁄ects
of aggregate demand policy. But it is assumed that, in the absence of shocks,
the economy converges to an equilibrium position, and cyclical ￿ uctuations are
generated by introducing stochastic shocks into models with a stable equilibrium
solution. If only prices and wages were ￿ exible, there would be no Keynesian
problems of e⁄ective demand.
The stability concerns that were at the centre of Keynes￿ s message have
been largely forgotten.19 Is there a NK answer to these stability concerns? Not
really. Stability is simply assumed in NK models, and most of the feedback
mechanisms analyzed by IKDD models are left out of the NK analysis. The NK
models typically involve saddlepoints and jump variables, and the presumption
of stability is used to pin down the outcome in the short run. Agents have
rational expectations, and the jump variables seek out the stable saddlepath.
Thus, to the extent that there is an answer, it comes from the NK focus on
microfoundations and rational expectations, and from the implicit rejection of
19The Japanese stagnation in the 1990s may have alerted the profession to some stability
issues, and the ￿ liquidity trap￿ has made a comeback (e.g. Krugman 1998, Nakatani and
Skott 2007). The liquidity trap arises because of an inability of monetary policy to reduce
interest rates, that is, to change intertemporal prices. It seems to have escaped attention,
however, that the liquidity trap and the problem of intertemporal prices are indicative of the
general stability problem. Money wage reductions fail to solve the unemployment problem
because "[a]ccording to Keynes￿diagnosis, it is fundamentally the intertemporal relative values
observed or implicit in the actual vector that are ￿ wrong￿ ", and, "although the most eye-
catching symptom of maladjustment is the great excess supply in the labor markets, ... the
burden of adjustment should not be thrown on this market.￿(Leijonhufvud, 1968, p. 338 and
336; italics in original)
13the old Keynesian analysis because of its alleged de￿ciencies in these areas.
Rational expectations have been used before Muth and Lucas, although with-
out using that name. Keynes￿ s own GT approach of assuming that short-period
expectations are ful￿lled is an example of rational expectations in the sense of
perfect foresight, and Harrod￿ s (1939) warranted growth path also represents
a rational expectations path. But the extension of rational expectations to all
models - and not just steady growth paths or Robinsonian mythical ages - lacks
both theoretical and empirical foundations. We con￿ne our attention to a few
observations about theory.
The theoretical argument relies on the claim that the systematic deviations
characterizing other speci￿cations would lead to changes in expectation forma-
tion. This claim has some force and, indeed, changing expectations may be an
important source of instability (as suggested by the role of ￿ animal spirits￿in
Keynesian analyses). But the claim does not justify a focus on rational expec-
tations. It has been notoriously di¢ cult to get convergence to rational expec-
tations even in simple models of rational learning, and the real-world learning
process takes place within a complex overall environment and one that is sub-
ject to constant and profound technical and institutional change (Frydman and
Phelps, 1983). These changes in the environment may lead to shifts in expecta-
tions; indeed, some institutional or structural change is often invoked to justify
expectations that would otherwise seem unreasonable, viz. the appeal to a ￿ new
economy￿during the stock market boom of the 1990s. However, structural and
institutional changes of this kind count against rational expectations since the
learning processes underlying the claims in favor of rational expectations fare
better in a stable environment, and the learning argument is particularly vul-
nerable with respect to some of the key variables of macroeconomic interest -
saving for retirement, for instance, or educational choices (investment in human
capital) - where essentially each agent makes only a single decision.20 21
4.3 Dynamics and expectations in IKDD models
Models in the IKDD framework have departed from the New Keynesian opti-
mizing approach and used behavioral equations and dynamic adjustment mech-
20A dismissal of stability concerns cannot be justi￿ed by reference to Walrasian general
equilibrium theory. In fact, the realization that stability had not and probably could not be
established under reasonable assumptions may have been a critical factor behind the virtual
abandonment in microeconomics of all research on Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Kir-
man, 1989, Katzner 2004). Joan Robinson￿ s criticism of tatonnement-based stability should
have provided additional impetus for this shift, but her criticism was not widely understood
(e.g. Robinson (1962, pp. 23-29), Skott (2005a)).
21Not all New Keynesian contributions ignore stability issues. A notable exception is the
work of Hahn and Solow (1995), who develop an overlapping-generations model and introduce
real money balances using a variant of the Clower constraint to show that wage-price ￿exibility
can result in macroeconomic instability. They also show that wage and price sluggishness as
explained by standard NK techniques can be stabilizing but also prevent the economy from
attaining full employment. However their model becomes extremely unwieldy, primarily due
to its optimizing assumptions and they have to resort to simulation techniques to examine the
behavior of the economy.
14anisms along ￿old￿Keynesian lines. As noted earlier, these models use sophis-
ticated mathematical and computational techniques to formalize many of the
arguments of the old Keynesian approach and the stability properties are ana-
lyzed rigorously. These models, moreover, avoid a "rational expectations perfect
foresight methodology according to which variables, when out of steady-state
equilibrium, are allowed to jump to their stable paths in order to ensure conver-
gence back to steady state" (Flaschel, Franke and Semmler, 1997, p. xi). We
consider this a promising approach, but have reservations with respect to some
of the behavioral and institutional assumptions. In this section we look brie￿ y
at technical aspects relating to the treatment of expectations; section 5 takes
up some broader issues.
Some IKDD writings suggest that the absence of perfect foresight is consis-
tent with myopic perfect foresight, not just at a particular moment but at all
times along a complete dynamic trajectory. We ￿nd this claim is surprising.
If one leaves a world of complete perfect foresight, there must be times when
expectations fail to be met. Disappointed medium- or long-run expectations
must show up in the form of disappointed short-run expectations at some mo-
ment, and an assumption of myopic perfect foresight concerning all variables
at all times would seem to imply globally perfect foresight. Thus, we are not
convinced that
"Keynesian IS-LM dynamics proper (demand driven growth and
business ￿ uctuations) must remain intact if (generally minor) er-
rors in in￿ ationary expectations are excluded from consideration"
(ACFF, p. 211, this volume).
On the contrary, it is not surprising if an economy with myopic foresight
at all times behaves in a way that di⁄ers qualitatively from economies without
myopic perfect foresight.
ACFF get around the problem ￿ and the qualitative di⁄erence between
economies with and without myopic perfect foresight at all times ￿by intro-
ducing a new variable, the "in￿ ationary climate". Wage and price formation,
they assume, depend on the in￿ ationary climate as well as on the (perfectly fore-
seen) current rate of in￿ ation. The in￿ ationary climate is seen as an expression
of in￿ ation expectations for the medium-run expectations, and it is suggested
that
"In￿ ationary expectations over the medium run, ^ ￿
c, i.e., the in￿ a-
tionary climate in which current wage and price in￿ ation is operat-
ing, may be adaptively following the actual rate of in￿ ation (by use
of some exponential weighting scheme), may be based on a rolling
sample (with hump-shaped weighting schemes), or on other possi-
bilities for updating expectations. For simplicity of exposition we
shall here make use of the conventional adaptive expectations mech-
anism." (p. 213)
15This interpretation of ^ ￿
c as an expectational variable may be hard to sustain:
why should the current in￿ ation rate lead anyone to adjust his or her medium-
run expectations (the "in￿ ationary climate") if the current rate is exactly as
expected?22 23 What matters from a technical perspective, however, is the
existence of an inertial element in wage and price formation. If there is myopic
perfect foresight, it is essential that something prevents wage and price setters
from acting fully on their foresight. That something need not be adaptive
medium-run in￿ ation expectations; an alternative source might be institutional
features of the economy, including staggered wage contracts, as in some NK
formulations. The precise source of the inertial element may be irrelevant for the
analysis of the dynamic properties of the model. The source becomes important,
however, if one wants to evaluate the model in relation to real-world economies
and discuss the robustness of the speci￿cation to various shocks or changes in
policy rules.
5 Post Keynesian, structuralist and neo-Marxian
alternatives
The AD-AS tradition ￿ including the recent work on ￿ integrated Keynesian
disequilibrium dynamics￿by Chiarella and Flaschel and their associates ￿rightly
stresses the need to consider dynamic interactions across markets, and it is
justi￿ably critical of optimization methodology. But theories in the AD-AS
tradition need to be developed not just in terms of more advanced mathematical
analysis of the dynamic interactions but also in terms of a renewed attention
to the behavioral and institutional assumptions and their implications for the
speci￿cation of the various equations.
The behavioral foundations have not been neglected in the Keynesian liter-
ature, as is evident from even a cursory look at Keynes￿ s own analysis or the
e⁄orts of many old Keynesians. Nonetheless, some of the presumptions of the
AD-AS tradition seem questionable from a heterodox perspective. A post Key-
nesian approach questions the limited role of aggregate demand in determining
22Adjustments to the in￿ation climate may occur, even in the absence of surprises, if the
in￿ation climate is de￿ned as
￿c(t) =
1 R
0
￿e(￿)￿e￿￿(￿￿t)d￿
In this case, an unchanged trajectory of future expected in￿ation rates implies that
_ ￿c(t) = ￿(￿c(t) ￿ ￿(t))
But this speci￿cation, which corresponds to a negative adjustment parameter in the adaptive
speci￿cation, is very di⁄erent from the one used by ACFF.
23Disappointed expectations could show up as unanticipated changes in inventories rather
than as unanticipated in￿ation. But if the surprises manifest themselves in quantity move-
ments, presumably adjustments in the in￿ation climate should be related to these quantity
movements, rather than to the deviations between the current in￿ation rate and the in￿ation-
ary climate.
16medium- and long-run growth patterns in AD-AS models; a neo-Marxian ap-
proach suggests a greater focus on income distribution and its interaction with
the rate of accumulation and the movements in the ￿ reserve army of labor￿ ; a
structuralist approach (see Taylor, 1991, 2004) emphasizes the need to examine
how the structural and institutional characteristics of economies determine their
dynamics.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the behavioral alternatives in
any detail. We shall con￿ne ourselves to a few of examples of what we have in
mind. The examples concern a simple model of the short run using the AD-AS
framework, and assumptions that a⁄ect the role of aggregate demand in the
medium and long run. We shall focus on the medium- and long-run steady
states of these model rather than on the stability of these steady states.
5.1 A short-run AD-AS model
We examine a simple AD-AS model of the short-run determination of output
and price using elements of post-Keynesian, structuralist and neo-Marxian ap-
proaches to macroeconomics.24 The model uses standard goods and money
market equilibrium conditions given by equations (1) and (2) above. We as-
sume that wage income is entirely consumed whereas a fraction s of non-wage
(or what can be called pro￿t) income is saved, as is common in all three ap-
proaches.25 Hence we replace equation (3) of the previous model with
C =
W
P
N + (1 ￿ s)[Y ￿
W
P
N] (3￿ )
We introduce expectations explicitly in the investment function and write
I = I(r;E) (4￿ )
where E denotes the state of long-term expectations. In this paper we treat
E as a parameter, and thus it adds very little to the model, but we include it
since E may have a strong in￿ uence on investment, as emphasized by Keynes
and the post-Keynesians; the e⁄ect of the interest rate, on the other hand, may
be weak. We leave the demand for money equation (5) unchanged, although
it would make sense to include E as an argument in the function. We replace
the production function with diminishing returns to labor given by equation (6)
above with a ￿xed coe¢ cients production function which states that output is
produced with capital and labor. With the stock of capital given in the short
run, with ￿rms maintaining excess capacity and hiring labor according to the
needs of production we have
24This type of model has been extensively used in the post-Keynesian and structuralist
literatures. We draw here on the version discussed in Dutt and Skott (1996).
25Di⁄erential saving propensities need not be the result of heterogeneity among households,
￿ capitalist households￿(rentiers) having a higher saving propensity than ￿ worker households￿ .
This kind of heterogeneity may play a role, but Kaldor￿ s "Neo-Pasinetti Theorem" provides
an alternative explanation (Kaldor 1966a, Skott 1981).
17N = a0Y (6￿ )
where a0 is the ￿xed unit labor requirement. Firms are assumed to operate in
an oligopolistic environment and set their price as a markup on labor costs, so
that
P = (1 + z)Wa0 (7￿ )
where z is the ￿xed markup rate. This approach, used initially by Kalecki
(1971), is now adopted by some standard mainstream textbooks and is exten-
sively used by post-Keynesian and structuralists. The equation can be derived
from optimization; eschewing formal optimization, a post-Keynesian explana-
tion may suggest that ￿rms ignore ￿soft￿information about demand and set
their price using ￿hard￿information regarding costs, while a structuralist jus-
ti￿cation relies on empirical studies of ￿rms within speci￿c structural environ-
ments. The markup is in￿ uenced by the degree of concentration, as emphasized
by Kalecki, but can also incorporate neo-Marxian notions of class struggle as
also mentioned by Kalecki. Finally, we keep the money wage ￿xed assuming
that there is enough unemployed labor, therefore maintaining equation (8).
The two adjustment variables in the short run are Y , which responds posi-
tively to excess demand in the goods market, and M, which responds positively
to excess demand in the money market. The ￿rst adjustment follows from a sim-
ple quantity adjustment story while the second one follows the post-Keynesian
horizontalist or endogenous money view according to which the excess demand
for money leads to an expansion of loans which create bank deposits, at an
interest rate, r0, determined by the Central Bank￿ s target rate and the markup
charged by banks (see, for instance, Moore, 1988).
The AD-AS curves can be derived as follows. Equations (3￿ ), (4￿ ), (6￿ ), (8)
and the new equation r = r0, can be substituted into equation (1) to obtain the
AD curve. The negative slope of this curve is explained by the fact that a higher
P reduces the real wage, redistributes income away from wage earners, reduces
consumption demand, and induces ￿rms to reduce output. The role of equation
(2) is simply to determine the demand for money. The AS curve is given by
equation (7￿ ) and is horizontal. Equilibrium output and price are determined
at the intersection of the AD and AS curves.
This version of an AD-AS model ￿like the textbook speci￿cation in sec-
tion 2 ￿ has many shortcomings and is only a starting point for further analysis.
Arguably, however, it provides a better representation of key structural charac-
teristics of a modern economy. Moreover, it demonstrates in a simple manner
some of the potential destabilizing forces at work in the economy. If unemploy-
ment results in a fall in the money wage, W, this results in a fall in the price
level, and if the markup, z, is unchanged, both the AD and AS curves will move
down by the same amount, keeping output and employment the same. If, how-
ever, the fall in the money wage leads to a fall in the real wage, or an increase in
z, the AS curve shifts down less than the AD curve, which reduces output and
18employment and increases unemployment. These kinds of destabilizing forces
have been explored in the IKDD models.
5.2 The medium run: Fairness and the ￿ natural rate of
unemployment￿
If the adjustment of the economy in the face of unemployment is stable, it
will tend towards the ￿ natural rate of unemployment￿ of the economy. The
existence of such a rate has been a mainstay of NK models, and most of the
IKDD extensions of the AD-AS models share this feature; the natural rate of
unemployment may not be asymptotically stable in the models, but cycles take
place around a structurally determined long-run.26 The existence of a natural
rate of unemployment implies that aggregate demand plays (almost) no role
in the determination of the trend of output and the average long-run value of
the unemployment rate. We ￿nd this aspect of the models questionable, both
empirically and theoretically.
Money wages may be sticky partly because workers care about relative wages
(as suggested by Keynes). This argument implies a rejection of a traditional
view of preferences as de￿ned over the agent￿ s own consumption. Instead, a
notion of fairness becomes central, and the behavioral literature has provided
strong support for the role of ￿ fairness￿in wage formation (see, for instance,
Bewley, 1998, Fehr and G￿chter, 2000, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The literature
also shows that changes in nominal wages are relevant for the perceived fairness
26The empirical section of chapter 7 in this volume has a brief discussion of hysteresis
in European unemployment but basically uses a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter to generate a time-
varying NAIRU.
19of the wage o⁄er. The relevance of nominal changes implies a kind of ￿ money
illusion￿ . As a result, there is no natural rate of unemployment. Instead, a
downward sloping Phillips curve emerges, and demand policies may a⁄ect real
output and employment in the medium and long run (Sha￿r et al., 1997, Akerlof
et al., 1996).
A more radical conclusion can be obtained if it is recognized that norms of
fairness may change over time and that the prevailing wage norms are strongly
in￿ uenced by the actual wage patterns in the past. Thus, according to Kah-
neman et al. (1986, p. 730-1) notions of fairness tend to adjust gradually to
actual outcomes:27
the reference transaction provides a basis for fairness judgments
because it is normal, not because it is just. Psychological studies of
adaptation suggest that any stable state of a⁄airs tends to become
accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no
longer readily come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially
seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of reference transaction.
Thus, the gap between the behavior that people consider fair and
the behavior that they expect in the market-place tends to be rather
small.
Skott (1999, 2005) shows that this conventional aspect of wage norms may
lead to employment hysteresis, even in models that exclude money illusion of any
kind.28 If in￿ ationary expectations are formed adaptively and adjustments in
wage norms take a simple linear form, the models generate a downward-sloping
Phillips curve. In general, however, aggregate demand policy will a⁄ect output
in the medium run, but there will be no well-behaved Phillips relation, vertical
or downward￿ sloping, between employment and the in￿ ation rate.
These examples illustrate how lessons from behavioral economics may cast
doubt on the natural rate hypothesis.29 Theoretical doubts might not carry a
lot of weight if the empirical evidence was overwhelming, but this is not the
case. Even strong supporters of the framework concede that the applicability
of the theory may be limited. Thus, Gordon (1997, p. 28) concludes that
27The conventional aspect of fairness is implicit in many discussions of these issues. Keynes
(1930a), for instance, expressed his sympathy with the view that "there is a large arbitrary
element in the relative rates of remuneration, and the factors of production get what they
do, not because in any strict sense they precisely earn it, but because past events have led to
these rates being customary and usual" (quoted from Keynes 1981, p. 7). Marshall (1887)
noted that fairness must be de￿ned "with reference to the methods of industry, the habits of
life and the character of the people" (p.212). Fairness, he argues, requires that a worker
ought to be paid for his work at the usual rate for his trade and neighbourhood;
so that he may live in that way to which he and his neighbours in his rank of
life have been accustomed. (p. 213; italics added)
Similar views have been advocated by Hicks (1974) and Solow (1990).
28Here we use the term hysteresis in a broad sense to include zero-root models, and not just
models with ￿ remanence￿(see Cross, 1988).
29Other theoretical and arguments against the natural rate hypothesis are discussed in, for
instance, Cross (1988, 1995).
20Within the postwar experience of the United States, the modest
￿ uctuations in the NAIRU seem plausible in magnitude and tim-
ing. When applied to Europe or to the United States in the Great
Depression, however, ￿ uctuations in the NAIRU seem too large to
be plausible and seem mainly to mimic movements in the actual
unemployment rate.
From a Popperian perspective, Gordon￿ s reading of the evidence must imply
that the theory should be rejected.
5.3 The long run: Growth, accumulation and technologi-
cal change
Models of the long run, which introduce capital accumulation, technological
change and labor supply growth, are generally of two varieties.
By far the more popular one is the one in which aggregate demand disappears
from the scene and aggregate supply determines growth. In fact, neoclassical
growth theory following Solow (1956), and new growth theory, following Romer
(1986) and others, abstracts entirely from the AD side, assuming perpetual full
employment and investment being determined identically by saving. The debate
between neoclassical and new growth theory revolves around whether or not the
marginal product of the produced factor of production, capital, falls to zero as
the capital-labor ratio rises inde￿nitely and, therefore, whether long-run growth
is a⁄ected by the saving rate and other economic variables. The neglect of AD
is usually not explicitly explained in these models, but it is implicitly assumed
that wage and price ￿ exibility will remove unemployment in the medium run or,
failing that, that government aggregate demand policy will do the job. Thus,
the long-run growth path is independent of AD factors.
A less popular variety, with roots in the Keynesian theories of Harrod (1939),
Robinson (1962) and others, focuses on AD as determining growth. In these
models growth is determined by the interaction between aggregate demand and
supply factors (including, for instance, ￿rms￿pricing decisions). Some work in
this tradition has included the labor market explicitly and linked the long-run
rate of growth of output to the growth of the labor supply in e¢ ciency units
(see, for instance, Kaldor 1957, Skott 1989, Dutt 1992a). Most models, however,
do not impose the requirement that the unemployment rate be constant in the
long run but simply assume that the labor supply does not constrain the rate of
growth (see Marglin, 1984, Dutt, 1984, Taylor, 1991). These models have many
interesting implications, including the possibility that a more equal distribution
of income can increase the rate of growth and that technological change can
have immiserizing e⁄ects, and the assumption of no labor constraints can be
defended by pointing to the existence of large amounts of hidden unemploy-
ment in the primary and tertiary sectors in most countries, developed as well as
less developed, until some time in the post World War II period. For the more
recent period, however, the hidden-unemployment argument may not be persua-
sive, at least for advanced industrial countries. Most of the OECD economies
21arguably have become ￿ mature￿in Kaldor￿ s (1966) sense: they certainly have
unemployment, both open and disguised, but it would be misleading to treat the
labor supply to the modern sector as perfectly elastic and to disregard the labor
constraints on the long-run rate of growth. Even under conditions of maturity,
however, the rate of growth may be in￿ uenced by aggregate demand.
As argued in section 5.2, the rate of employment can not be taken as inde-
pendent of the demand side, even in the medium run, and this dependence of
employment on aggregate demand opens up ways in which demand may also
in￿ uence the rate of growth in the long run.
One channel runs through migration. Even if a country has exhausted its do-
mestic reserves of hidden unemployment, the possibility of immigration provides
an international reserve army and, immigration laws permitting, the growth rate
of the country need not be limited by its labor supply. Immigration laws respond
to economic conditions (as evidenced, for instance, by the change in attitudes
of European countries between the 1960s and the more recent period), and the
employment rate can therefore have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the rate of growth of
the labor force.30
Induced technical progress represents a second possible channel. Labor
shortages provide an incentive for ￿rms to seek out new labor saving techniques,
and this technology channel suggests that the rate of growth of the labor supply
in e¢ ciency units may be positively related to the employment rate. Both the
employment and technology channels imply that insofar as aggregate demand
policy in￿ uences the rate of employment, it also a⁄ects the long-run rate of
growth (Flaschel and Skott, 2006).31
A more radical approach is pursued by Dutt (2006) who considers a range
of models in which the rate of labor productivity growth responds to labor mar-
ket conditions, with tight labor markets speeding up labor-saving technological
change. One of the models makes the employment rate a⁄ect both changes in
the ￿ autonomous￿investment parameter (to capture the e⁄ects of unemployment
and wage reductions on aggregate demand through the Keynes e⁄ect) and the
rate of labor productivity growth. Since the same rate of employment makes
investment and labor productivity growth stationary, the result is a zero root
model in which a change in the level of autonomous demand (for instance, gov-
ernment expenditure) has a permanent e⁄ect on the long-run rate of growth.
The economy converges to its long-run rate of growth, at which the economy
grows with unemployment at its ￿ natural￿rate, but the long-run rate of growth
itself is a⁄ected by aggregate demand. AD and AS grow at the same rate, but
the growth rate of the economy is not independent of factors determining AD.
30This channel may be reinforced by the e⁄ects of unemployment on changes in the la-
bor force participation rate; women￿ s participation rate and the average retirement age, for
instance, may respond gradually to labor market conditions.
31Verdoorn￿ s-law e⁄ects in which learning by doing generates a positive impact of the rate of
growth of output on productivity growth imply an additional stimulus from faster immigration
to productivity growth.
226 Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that the older Keynesian tradition based on the
aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework provides a more suitable and
promising framework for building macroeconomics than the currently-dominant
approach, including its New Keynesian variant. This is so for a number of
reasons.
Contrary to what has been argued by a number of critics, ￿rst, the traditional
aggregate demand-aggregate supply approach is internally consistent, at least in
its Marshallian interpretation, as well as consistent with Keynes￿ s own analysis.
Second, it has the strength of explicitly including the major markets and
sectors of the economy and examining their interactions. In this sense it is a
general, rather than a partial, theory. Walrasian general equilibrium theory
may also be general in this sense, but is di⁄erent in several ways, including the
perspective on behavioral foundations.
Third, the aggregate demand-aggregate supply approach does not insist on
optimizing microfoundations. The AD-AS model is not necessarily inconsistent
with optimizing behavior, but the approach is eclectic. It starts with some basic
and commonly-used accounting identities, adds rules of behavior of individuals
or groups in speci￿c institutional settings, and examines their consequences for
the performance and evolution of the system. The theorist must be prepared to
explain and defend the choice of behavioral rules, but an appeal to optimization
is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for a successful defense. This eclecticism, we
have argued, is a strength, and the New Keynesian methodological position
is ￿ awed. New Keynesian macroeconomics has produced interesting insights,
but the insistence on optimizing microfoundations means that these insights
have come at the cost of neglecting a variety of important issues, including the
analysis of stability.
Fourth, it is true that a great deal of analysis using the aggregate demand￿
aggregate supply framework is mechanical and fails to capture important aspects
of reality, and its extensions to medium- and long-run issues typically ignore
the role of aggregate demand. However, unencumbered by the straightjacket of
optimizing microfoundations, the approach provides a useful starting point for
the analysis of dynamic macroeconomic interactions. In developing this analysis,
the approach can draw on insights from the Post Keynesian, neo-Marxian and
structuralist traditions, as well as from the burgeoning literature on behavioral
economics.
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